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Abstract
After the 2016 double dissolution election, the 45th Australian Parliament was formed. At the
time of its swearing in, the Senate of the 45th Australian Parliament consisted of nine political parties,
the largest number in the history of the Australian Parliament. Due to the breadth of the political
spectrum that the Senate represented, the situation presented an interesting opportunity for the study
of political interactions in the Australian context. Using publicly available Senate voting data in 2016,
we quantitatively analyzed two aspects of the Senate. Firstly, we analyzed the degree to which each of
the non-government parties of the Senate are pro- or anti-government. Secondly, we analyzed the degree
to which the votes of each of the non-government Senate parties are in concordance or discordance with
one another. We utilized the fully-visible Boltzmann machine (FVBM) model in order to conduct these
analyses. The FVBM is an artificial neural network that can be viewed as a multivariate generalization
of the Bernoulli distribution. Via a maximum pseudolikelihood estimation approach, we conducted
parameter estimation and constructed hypotheses test that revealed the interaction structures within the
Australian Senate. The conclusions that we drew are well-supported by external sources of information.
Key words: Australian Parliament, Bernoulli distribution, maximum pseudolikelihood estimation, minorization-
maximization algorithm, neural networks, parametric model
1 Introduction
At the federal level, or Commonwealth level, the Australian parliamentary government system is composed
of two houses, the House of Representatives, and the Senate (cf. Weller and Fleming, 2003). The House
of Representatives is composed of members who represent, and are elected by a nearly equal numbers of
voters (currently approximately 150,000 individuals) from the public. We make a note that the electorates
of Tasmania are notably smaller than the other states (currently approximately 100,000 individuals).
Furthermore, members of the House of Representatives are tasked with the role of debating legislation
and government policy, raising matters of concern, and importantly making laws via the introduction
of bills, or in the language of the Constitution, proposed laws. Currently, the House of Representatives
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consists of 150 members of parliament. We refer the interested reader to Wright and Fowler [2012] regarding
information about the House of Representatives of Australia.
In contrast to the House of Representatives, the Senate consists of 76 senators, who do not equally
represent the population, but the states and territories, instead. That is, each of the six states (i.e. New
South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia) are equally repre-
sented by 12 senators, and each of the two territories (i.e the Australian Capital Territory, and the Northern
Territory) are represented by two senators (cf. Evans, 2016, Ch. 1).
For any bill to pass to law, both the House of Representatives and the Senate must assent to the bill,
requiring a simple majority vote in each house. As such, the primary function of the senate is to represent
the people of each of the states and territories equally. It acts as a balance of power between the states with
large populations and the states with smaller populations, who are not able to secure numbers in the House
of Representatives. Although the Senate does not have the complete suite of powers to introduce bills, when
compared to the House of Representatives (e.g. the Senate cannot introduce taxing bills, appropriation bills,
or amend such bills), the Senate does have the power to reject any bills that are introduced by the House of
Representative, and request the amendment of introduced bills. More information regarding the Australian
Senate and its powers can be found in Evans [2016].
In 2016, following a double dissolution election (cf. Gauja et al. [2018]; Corcoran and Dickenson, 2010
define a double dissolution election as one where all seats of the House of Representatives and the Senate
are simultaneously contested), the Senate of the 45th Australian Parliament was formed. In normal election
cycles of three years, only half of the senators from each state face reelection, since each senator is elected
to a six year term (cf. Evans, 2016, Ch. 1). The territorial senators are elected to three year terms at
all elections, and thus face no special consequence from the special election. The double dissolution is
therefore particularly interesting, as the elected state senators all face reelection simultaneously, and thus
the composition of the seated Senate is more volatile than after a normal election. The elected Senate
consisted of senators from nine separate political parties, which is the largest number of political parties
in the history of the Senate (cf. Evans, 2016, Tab. 2). At the time of its swearing in, the Senate of the
45th Australian Parliament consisted of 30 senators from the governing Liberal National Party (LNP), 26
senators from the opposition Australian Labour Party (ALP), 9 senators from the Australian Greens (AG),
4 senators from Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON), 3 senators from the Nick Xenophon Team (NXT),
1 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) senator, 1 Family First Party (FFP) senator, 1 Jacqui Lambie Network
(JLN) senator, and 1 Derryn Hinch Justice Party (DHJP) senator.
When Senators vote on an item of legislation or a motion, the event is known as a division (cf. Corcoran
and Dickenson, 2010). Divisions data, at a party level, are recorded on the official Australian Parlia-
ment website at the URL: www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Statistics/Senate_StatsNet/
General/divisions.
In this article, we analyze the data from the first sitting of the Senate of the 45th Australian Parliament,
until the final sitting of the year 2016. The first division during this period was conducted on the 31st of
August 2016, and the last division was performed on the 1st of December 2016. In total, 147 divisions
were performed during this period. We have chosen this period due to the particular stability of the Senate
during the time. After this period, a number of events, including the so-called dual citizenship crisis (see,
e.g. Begg, 2017 and Hobbs et al., 2018) resulted in a high number of turnover and changes in the Senate
composition.
We seek to quantitatively analyze two aspects of the Senate. Firstly, we analyze the degree to which each
of the non-government parties of the Senate are pro- or anti-government. Secondly, we analyze the degree
to which the votes of each of the non-government Senate parties are in concordance or discordance with
one another. In order to answer both questions we seek to analyze the division data using a fully-visible
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Boltzmann machine (FVBM).
The Boltzmann machine (BM) is a parametric generative graphical probabilistic artificial neural network
(ANN) that was introduced in the seminal paper of Ackley et al. [1985]. The BM is a deep ANN with a
latent variable structure that is capable of universal representation of the probability mass function (PMF)
of multivariate binary random variables of any fixed dimension d ∈ N (cf, Le Roux and Bengio, 2008).
The FVBM, introduced in Hyvarinen [2006], is a simplification of the BM, which does not contain
a hidden variable structure. It is a type of log-linear graphical generative probabilistic model that is
comparable to the models that are studied in Lauritzen [1996]. It can also be considered as a multivariate
generalization of the Bernoulli random variable and is equivalent to the logistic multivariate binary model
proposed by Cox [1972]. Our use of the FVBM is motivated by that of Desmarais and Crammer [2010]
who construct FVBMs for the analysis of relationships between judges in the United States Supreme Court,
using data from 178 cases in the period between 2007 and 2008.
In Hyvarinen [2006], it was proved that an unknown parameter vector that determines the data gener-
ating process (DGP) of data arising from an FVBM can be estimated consistently via maximum pseudo-
likelihood estimation (MPLE) (also known as maximum composite likelihood estimation; see Lindsay, 1988
and Arnold and Strauss, 1991). An alternative proof of consistency can be found in Nguyen [2018].
Following from the work of Hyvarinen [2006], Nguyen and Wood [2016a] proved that the consistent
maximum pseudolikelihood estimator (MPLE) of an FVBM is also asymptotically normal. Furthermore, in
Nguyen and Wood [2016b], it was demonstrated that the MPLE for an FVBM could be efficiently computed
from data via an iterative block-successive lower bound maximization algorithm of the kind that is described
in Razaviyayn et al. [2013]. It was proved that the computational algorithm monotonically increases the
pseudolikelihood objective in each iteration, and that the limit point of the algorithm is a global maximum
of the objective function. In this paper, we utilize the R package BoltzMM [Jones and Nguyen, 2018], which
implements the methods and algorithms that are described in Nguyen and Wood [2016a] and Nguyen and
Wood [2016b], for the analysis of the our Senate data.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the FVBM, the MPLE
estimator, and the inferential tools that we will use. In Section 3, we describe our Senate data in detail,
and we discuss the details of our data processing protocol. In Section 4, we present the result of an analysis
of the Senate data via an FVBM and we discuss the results of the analysis. In Section 5, we draw some
conclusions regarding our work. Auxiliary and technical results are presented in the Appendix.
2 The fully-visible Boltzmann machine
Let X> = (X1, . . . , Xd) be a vector of spin binary random variables (i.e. Xj ∈ {−1,+1}; j ∈ [d] =
{1, . . . , d}). Here, (·)> is the transposition operator. We say that the DGP of X is a FVBM if it can be
characterized by the PMF
f (x;θ) = P (X = x)
=
exp
(
1
2x
>Mx+ x>b
)
z (θ)
, (1)
where
z (θ) =
∑
ξ∈{−1,1}d
exp
(
1
2
ξ>Mξ + ξ>b
)
,
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M ∈ Rd×d is a symmetric matrix with zeros along the diagonal, and b ∈ Rd. We call z (θ) the normalization
constant, and we put the unique elements of M and b into the [n (n− 1) /2 + n]-dimensional parameter
vector θ.
The bias vector b can be written as:
b> = (b1, . . . , bd) ,
where increasing the value of bj ∈ R (j ∈ [d]) increases the probability P (Xj = +1), ceteris paribus.
Similarly, decreasing the value of bj increases the probability P (Xj = −1), ceteris paribus.
The interaction matrix M can be written as:
M =

0 m12 m13 . . . m1d
m12 0 m23 . . . m2d
m13 m23 0
. . .
...
...
...
. . . . . . md−1,d
m1d m2d · · · md−1,d 0
 ,
where increasing the value of mjk ∈ R (j, k ∈ [d]; j < k) increases the probability P (Xj = Xk), ceteris
paribus. Similarly, decreases in the value of mjk increases the probability P (Xj 6= Xk), ceteris paribus.
Thus, the vector b controls the marginal probabilities of each element ofX, whereas the matrixM controls
the correlations between the elements of X.
2.1 Estimation of the FVBM parameter vector
Suppose that we observe n independent and identical replicates of X, say X1, . . . ,Xn, which arise from a
DGP that can be characterized by an FVBM with unknown parameter vector θ0. Since the FVBM is a
probabilistic model with PMF (1), we can construct the log-likelihood function
ln (θ) =
n∑
i=1
log f (Xi;θ)
=
1
2
n∑
i=1
X>i MXi +
n∑
i=1
X>i b− n log z (θ) ,
and estimate θ0 via the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE)
θˆn = arg max
θ
ln (θ) .
Unfortunately, for all but the smallest values of d, the log-likelihood function is prohibitively computa-
tionally expensive to work with, since the number of terms in z (θ) grows exponentially with d. Due to the
computational costs of obtaining the MLE, it is more common to consider the MPLE as an estimator of
θ0 in the FVBM context, instead (see, e.g. Hyvarinen, 2006, Desmarais and Crammer, 2010, Nguyen and
Wood, 2016b, and Nguyen and Wood, 2016a).
The so-called log-pseudolikelihood function, as used by the references above, can be written as
pn (θ) =
n∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
log f
(
Xij |Xi(j);θ
)
, (2)
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where X>(j) = (X1, . . . , Xj−1, Xj+1, . . . , Xd) and
f
(
xj |x(j);θ
)
=
exp
(
xjm
>
j x+ bjxj
)
exp
(
m>j x+ bj
)
+ exp
(−m>j x− bj) .
Here, mj is the jth column of M , and we call
∏d
j=1 f
(
Xj |X(j);θ
)
the individual pseudolikelihood of
observation X. Note that (2) no longer depends on the normalization constant z (θ). Like the MLE, the
MPLE can be defined as the maximizer of (2). That is, we can write the MPLE as
θ˜n = arg max
θ
pn (θ) . (3)
2.2 Properties of the MPLE
The MPLE has a number of desirable asymptotic properties. Firstly, via the results of Hyvarinen [2006]
and Nguyen [2018], the MPLE is proved to be a consistent estimator of θ0 in the case when the FVBM is a
well-specified model for the DGP of the data, and is proved to be Wald consistent, in the sense of van der
Vaart [1998, Sec. 5.2.1], when the FVBM is a misspecified model, respectively.
Furthermore, in either case (defining θ0 to be the true parameter vector in the well-specified case, or
the asymptotic global maximum of the expected log individual pseudolikelihood in the misspecified case),
the main theorem of Nguyen and Wood [2016a] yields the asymptotic normality of n1/2
(
θ˜n − θ0
)
. That is,
as n approaches infinity, n1/2
(
θ˜n − θ0
)
converges in law to a multivariate normal distribution with mean
vector 0 (the zero vector) and covariance matrix I−11 (θ0) I2 (θ0) I
−1
1 (θ0), where
I1 (θ) = −
d∑
j=1
E
[
∂2 log f
(
Xj |X(j);θ
)
∂θ∂θ>
]
,
and
I2 (θ) =
d∑
j=1
d∑
k=1
E
[
∂ log f
(
Xj |X(j);θ
)
∂θ
· ∂ log f
(
Xj |X(j);θ
)
∂θ>
]
.
Using the estimator θ˜n, we can consistently estimate the information matrices I1 (θ0) and I2 (θ0) via
the empirical information matrices I˜1
(
θ˜n
)
and I˜2
(
θ˜n
)
, respectively (cf. Boos and Stefanski, 2013, Sec.
7.8.3), where
I˜1 (θ) = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
∂ log f
(
Xij |Xi(j);θ
)
∂θ∂θ>
and
I˜2 (θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
d∑
k=1
∂ log f
(
Xij |Xi(j);θ
)
∂θ
· ∂ log f
(
Xij |Xi(j);θ
)
∂θ>
.
2.3 The block-successive lower bound maximization algorithm
Using the framework of block-successive lower bound maximization algorithms (also known as block minormization-
maximization algorithms; cf. Hunter and Lange, 2004 and Nguyen, 2017), Nguyen and Wood [2016b] pro-
posed the following iterative algorithm for the computation of (3), upon observing a realization x1, . . . ,xn
of X1, . . . ,Xn.
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Denote an initial estimate of the MPLE θ(0) and write the rth iterate of the algorithm as θ(r) (containing
the components M (r) and b(r)). At the rth iteration, in the order j = 1, 2, . . . , d, we compute
b
(r)
j =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
xij − tanh
(
m
(r−1)>
j xi + b
(r−1)
j
)]
+ b
(r−1)
j . (4)
Let m(r)jk be the jth row and kth column element of M
(r), and let M (s)[uv] be a symmetric matrix with
zeros along the diagonal and elements
m
(r)
[uv]jk =
{
m
(r+1)
jk , if j < u, or j = u and k < v,
m
(r)
jk , otherwise.
Then, in the lexicographical order
(i, j) = (1, 2) , . . . , (1, d) , (2, 3) , (2, 4) , . . . , (d− 1, d) ,
we compute
m
(r)
jk =
1
2n
n∑
i=1
[
2xijxik − xik tanh
(
m
(r−1)>
[jk]j xi + b
(r)
j
)
− xij tanh
(
m
(r−1)>
[jk]k xi + b
(r)
k
)]
+m
(r−1)
jk , (5)
where m(r)[uv]j is the jth column of the matrix M
(r)
[uv]. The iterations (4) and (5) are repeated until some
convergence criterion is meet (e.g., until r = R, where R is some large number). The final iterate is then
used as the MPLE estimator θ˜n.
In Nguyen and Wood [2016b], it is proved that the algorithm defined by (4) and (5) is monotonic, in the
sense that pn
(
θ(r)
) ≤ pn (θ(r+1)), for each r ∈ N. That is, the algorithm increases the log-pseudolikelihood
objective in each iteration. Furthermore, it is also proved that for any starting value θ(0), the limit point
of the algorithm θ(∞) = limr→∞ θ(r) is the global maximizer of the log-pseudolikelihood function pn (θ).
Thus, the algorithm is globally convergent to the global maximizer of the objective, regardless of how it is
initialized. The two results guarantee the stability and correctness of the described algorithm.
2.4 Hypothesis testing
Using the Wald statistics construction of Molenberghs and Verbeke [2005, Sec. 9.3.1], we can construct a
statistic to test the hypotheses that
H0 : θk = θ0k, versus H1 : θk 6= θ0k,
where θk (θ0k) is the kth element of θ (θ0), for k ∈ [n (n− 1) /2 + n]. For each k, the z-score form of the
Wald statistic can be given as
Zk =
θˆnk − θ0k√
σˆ2nk/n
, (6)
where σˆ2n,k is the kth diagonal element of the matrix I˜
−1
1
(
θ˜n
)
I˜2
(
θ˜n
)
I˜−11
(
θ˜n
)
. Under the null hypothesis
H0, Zk is asymptotically standard normal. This asymptotic result can be used as an approximation in order
to construct finite-sample hypothesis tests.
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Table 1: Voting patterns for each of the PHON senators on the 12 “Split” entries within the divisions data.
All dates are in the year 2016 and the number indicates which division item on the date that the vote
corresponded to.
Date Number Burston Culleton Hanson Roberts
13/9 2 No Yes No No
14/9 4 Yes No Yes Yes
23/11 1 No No Yes Yes
29/11 2 No Yes No No
29/11 3 No Yes No No
29/11 4 No Yes No No
30/11 7 No Yes No No
30/11 8 No Yes No No
30/11 11 No Yes No No
01/12 4 No Yes No -
01/12 10 No Yes No No
01/12 25 No Yes No No
3 The Senate data
The data that we study are taken directly from www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Statistics/
Senate_StatsNet/General/divisions. In particular, we study the divisions data taken from the first
sitting of the Senate of the 45th Australian Parliament, until the final sitting during the 2016 calendar year.
The data contains n = 147 rows and each of the columns of the data contains an indicator of how the
particular party (i.e. LNP, ALP, AG, NXT, PHON, LDP, FFP, JLN, and DHJP) voted on each of the n
items of legislation. The indicators were “Yes” (indicating a vote in favor of the legislation), “No” (indicating
a vote against the legislation), “Split” (indicating that the members of the party did not all vote in the same
direction), and “-/[blank]” (indicating no vote cast).
3.1 Data processing
Our first preprocessing step is to investigate and decide upon whether the “Split” indicator should be
relabeled as “Yes” or “No”. Upon investigation, we notice that all of the “Split” entries arose from the same
party: PHON. Although tedious, it was possible to ascertain the manner in which the different members of
PHON voted in each of the 12 “Split” votes. These data were obtained from the Senate Journal, which are
textual documents that contain the untabulated data regarding votes on Senate questions at the individual
level, within their contents. The Senate Journal documents can be obtained at parlinfo.aph.gov.au.
Table 1 presents the voting pattern of the four members of PHON (Senators Burston, Culleton, Hanson,
and Roberts) on the 12 “Split” entries.
Upon inspecting the details of Table 1, we observe that Senator Culleton went against the party leader
(Senator Hanson) on every one of the 12 occasions. The only other person to vote in the opposite direction
to Senator Hanson was Senator Burston, on 23 November. The table also shows that Senator Roberts
missed division number 4 on 1 December.
On 18 December 2016, Senator Culleton resigned from PHON and sat as an independent Senator. Fur-
thermore, on 23 December 2016, the Federal Court of Australia found that Senator Culleton was bankrupt,
which raised questions regarding his eligibility to remain on the Senate (cf. Phillips and Kerr, 2017). It
7
was not until February 2017 that Senator Culleton was disqualified from the Senate by the High Court of
Australia (cf. Stubbs, 2017). The disqualification was largely due to the fact that the Senator was convicted
of a criminal offense, prior to his election, and thus was not eligible to stand for the Senate during the 2016
election [Remeikis, 2017].
We can conclude that Senator Culleton was influential, as an independent entity, during the year of
2016. We choose to handle the “Split” entries in the following way: firstly, Senator Culleton will be treated
as a separate entity to the rest of PHON, and secondly, the majority vote is taken as the indicator for the
rest of the PHON entries. We note that in all but one case, the majority vote is also the unanimous vote.
Next, the indicator “-/[blank]” was taken to be a missing data entry in the context of our analysis. Taken
as such, we found that the FFP column contained 142 missing data entries. Upon review, the large number
of missing entries in the FFP column was due to various ineligibility issues regarding the only FFP Senator
at the time, Bob Day (cf. Stubbs, 2017). Since the FFP played a minimal role in the Senate during the
investigated period, we eliminated the FFP column from our data.
The remainder of the data contained a further 54 missing entries out of a potential 147 × 9 = 1323
entries. We considered this missingness be a minor issue (only 4.08%) and used 3-nearest neighbor impu-
tation (cf. Troyanskaya et al., 2001) in order to fill in the missing entries. The choice of 3-nearest neighbor
imputation was made to balance between precision and generalizability, as suggested in Beretta and San-
taniello [2016]. We conducted the imputation via the function knn.impute() within the R package: bnstruct
[Franzin et al., 2017]. See R Core Team [2016] regarding R. We note that other levels of k for k-nearest
neighbor imputation were also assessed, although we found that our inference was insensitive to the choice
of k (see the Appendix for details).
Next, we construct the binary random variables of interest: the agreement of each Senate party’s vote
with the Government’s vote on each item of legislation. For each of the non-government parties (i.e. not
LNP) we construct new columns of data. The new entries of data can be given as xij where i denote the
index of the legislation and j denotes the index of the party. We set xij to +1 if both the LNP and the
jth party voted “Yes” or “No” on legislation i. We set xij to −1 if the LNP voted “Yes” and the jth party
voted “No”, or vice versa, if the LNP voted “No” and the jth party voted “Yes”. For each item of legislation
i ∈ [n] (n = 147), the vector x>i = (xi1, . . . , xid) (d = 8) summaries the agreement or disagreement of each
of the non-government Senate parties (excluding the FFP, and including Senator Culleton, which we code
as CULL, as his own entity) with the Government.
4 Analysis of the Senate data
The analysis of the processed Senate data was conducted using the R package BoltzMM. The main function
of the package is the fitfvbm function, which applies the algorithm from Section 2.3 in order to compute the
MPLE vector θ˜n. The functions fvbmHess, fvbmcov, and fvbmstderr, can then be applied to compute the es-
timated standard errors for each element of θ˜n, under the normal approximation afforded by the asymptotic
normality of the MPLE (i.e. the root diagonal elements of the matrix n−1I−11
(
θ˜n
)
I2
(
θ˜n
)
I−11
(
θ˜n
)
).
Using the functions from BoltzMM, we computed the elements of MPLE θ˜n for the Senate data and we
estimated the standard error for each element of θ˜n. The MPLE and standard error estimates are presented
in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
Via the Wald hypothesis test construction from Section 2.4, and using the results from Tables 2 and 3,
we conducted tests of the null hypotheses that θk = 0, versus the alternative hypothesis that θk 6= 0, for
each k ∈ [n (n− 1) /2 + n], where each θk is an element of the true parameter vector θ, which specifies the
DGP of the observations. The test statistic for each k is computed as per (6). The p-value of each test,
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Table 2: Sub-table A contains the estimated values of the bias vector (i.e. b˜n). Sub-table B contains the
estimated values of the unique elements of the interaction matrix (i.e M˜n).
A
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP CULL
Bias -0.321 -1.037 -0.209 0.941 0.384 -0.559 0.693 -0.383
B
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP
AG -0.203
NXT -0.185 -0.284
PHON -0.370 0.147 0.371
LDP 0.173 -0.053 -0.208 0.512
JLN 0.321 0.626 0.419 0.394 0.024
DHJP 0.059 0.601 0.808 -0.498 0.224 0.077
CULL 0.042 -0.710 -0.146 1.287 0.116 0.397 0.801
Table 3: Sub-table A contains the estimated standard errors for the MPLE bias vector. Sub-table B contains
the estimated standard errors of the unique elements of the MPLE interaction matrix.
A
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP CULL
St. Err. 0.165 0.207 0.208 0.274 0.164 0.194 0.239 0.326
B
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP
AG 0.130
NXT 0.130 0.218
PHON 0.212 0.240 0.268
LDP 0.130 0.141 0.158 0.219
JLN 0.117 0.154 0.141 0.216 0.131
DHJP 0.144 0.248 0.163 0.335 0.149 0.157
CULL 0.212 0.274 0.232 0.260 0.211 0.178 0.337
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Table 4: Sub-table A contains the p-values for the tests that each bias vector element is equal to zero.
Sub-table B contains the p-values for the tests that each interaction matrix element is equal to zero.
A
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP CULL
p-val 5.20E-02 5.71E-07 3.13E-01 5.89E-04 1.94E-02 3.92E-03 3.79E-03 2.40E-01
B
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP
AG 1.16E-01
NXT 1.56E-01 1.92E-01
PHON 8.13E-02 5.39E-01 1.66E-01
LDP 1.84E-01 7.09E-01 1.88E-01 1.91E-02
JLN 5.87E-03 5.01E-05 2.90E-03 6.75E-02 8.56E-01
DHJP 6.85E-01 1.53E-02 7.24E-07 1.37E-01 1.34E-01 6.21E-01
CULL 8.42E-01 9.55E-03 5.29E-01 7.58E-07 5.83E-01 2.57E-02 1.74E-02
Table 5: The first row of the table contains model-based probability estimates of the marginal probabilities
of agreement P (Xj = +1), for each Senate party j, computed using the function allpfvbm. The second row
contains the corresponding empirical proportions.
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP CULL
Model 0.330 0.122 0.581 0.815 0.784 0.342 0.649 0.761
Empirical 0.333 0.129 0.592 0.810 0.782 0.354 0.660 0.755
computed using normal approximations as justified by the results of Section 2.2, are presented in Table 4.
The function allpfvbm allows for the calculation of the probability of all possible outcomes, under the
fitted FVBM. Summing over the probabilities for each party, we can obtain the marginal probabilities of
each party voting in correspondence with the government on each Senate question. These model-estimated
probabilities are reported in Table 5. We also report, for comparison, the empirical proportions computed
as the proportion p¯j = n−1
∑n
i=1 Jxij = +1K for each party j, where J·K is the Iverson bracket notation for
the indicator function [Graham et al., 1989, Ch. 2].
Upon observation of Table 5, we firstly notice that the probabilities obtained under the fitted FVBM
model closely resemble those that are obtained via the computation of empirical proportions. We note that
the smallest standard error (calculated using the usual expression [p¯j (1− p¯j) /n]1/2, using the proportion
for the party AG) is 0.028, and thus the smallest approximately-normal 95% confidence interval margin of
error over all of the proportions is 2 × 0.028 = 0.056. We see that the model-estimated probabilities all
fall comfortably within the 95% confidence interval of the empirical proportions, and thus the two sets of
estimates can be seen to be sufficiently close.
Secondly, we notice that all but two of the model-estimated probabilities (or empirical proportions)
correspond well with the sign of the estimated bias parameter elements (from Table 2A). That is, ALP,
AG, and JLN each have negative bias estimates and each vote in agreement with the government less than
50% of the time. We also observe that PHON, LDP, and DHJP all have positive estimated biases and all
vote in agreement with the government greater than 50% of the time.
The two situations where the biases and marginal probabilities are in different direction are for NXT and
CULL. Both NXT and CULL have negative biases but vote in agreement with the government more than
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50% of the time. In both cases, the differences in the direction can be attributed to the strong interactions
positive interaction between the two parties under discussion and other parties that are biased towards
agreement with the government (namely PHON and DHJP).
From Table 2B, we observe that the interaction coefficient between NXT and DHJP is the second
highest estimated value, at 0.808. Using the function allpfvbm, we can obtain the joint PMF between the
two parties. The estimated joint PMF indicates that both parties vote in agreement with the government
with probability 0.528 and both parties vote against the government with probability 0.298. Furthermore,
NXT votes with the government whilst DHJP votes against the government with probability 0.053, and
NXT votes against the government whilst DHJP votes with the government with probability 0.121. From
these values, we can see that the two parties vote in concordance with one another with at an estimated
rate of 82.6% of the time. Thus, it is not surprising that although NXT has a slightly negative bias, that
the strong relationship with DHJP influences NXT to vote in agreement with the government at a rate that
is higher than 50%.
Again, from Table 2B, we observe that the interaction coefficient between CULL and PHON is the
highest estimated value, at 1.287. This is unsurprising, since we know from Table 1 that CULL and PHON
agree on all but 12 Senate items. Using the function allpfvbm, we can obtain the joint PMF between the
two parties. The estimated joint PMF indicates that both parties vote in agreement with the government
with probability 0.746 and both parties vote against the government with probability 0.170. Furthermore,
CULL votes with the government whilst PHON votes against the government with probability 0.015, and
CULL votes against the government whilst PHON votes with the government with probability 0.069. The
joint PMF thus indicates that the two parties vote in concordance with one another at an estimated rate
of 91.6%. This explains why CULL has an agreement rate with the government that is greater than 50%,
even while the estimated bias is negative.
From the results that were presented above, we can remark that one cannot therefore interpret the bias
estimates b˜n and the empirical proportions p¯j (and model-estimated probabilities) in the same manner.
The biases provide an interpretation of the behavior of each party when interactions between the parties
are simultaneously being accounted for. Alternatively, the empirical proportions and model-estimated
probabilities can provide an interpretation of the behavior of each party, marginally, without accounting
for the their interaction with the other Senate entities.
From the results of Tables 2 and 4, we can construct the network diagram that is presented in Figure 1.
We can interpret the diagram as follows, with hypotheses declared significant or otherwise at the α = 0.05
level. Each node is colored blue, grey, or red, depending on whether the estimated bias of the corresponding
party is significant with a positive bias, insignificant, or significant with a negative bias, respectively. Each
node is more opaque if the absolute value of the estimated bias is higher.
The edges connecting each node are either solid or dashed. A solid edge indicates that the interaction
between the two connected parties is significant, and a dashed edge indicates that the interaction is in-
significant. An edge is colored blue if the interaction between the two parties is positive, and a red edge
indicates a negative interaction. The edge thickness is directly proportional to the negative logarithm of
the p-value of the corresponding interaction between the two parties.
We note that 5 out of the 8 bias elements are inferred to be significant different from zero, and 10
out of the 28 interaction elements are inferred to be significantly different to zero. Given such a large
number of simultaneous hypothesis tests, and such a large number of significant results, it is prudent to
control for the potentially inflated numbers of false positives that may occur. Towards this goal, we choose
to employ the paradigm of false discovery rate (FDR) control, as considered by Benjamini and Hochberg
[1995]. Since there are potential dependencies between the hypotheses that are tested, we choose to use the
method of Benjamini and Yekutieli [2001], which is able to control the FDR in the presence of dependencies
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Figure 1: Visualization of the significance and interaction results from Tables 2 and 4. Descriptions of the
various elements of the figure appear within the text.
between hypotheses. We adjust the p-values so that we may control the FDR via the method of Benjamini
and Yekutieli [2001] via the p.adjust function in R. The adjusted p-values can be interpreted as per the
unadjusted p-values, albeit with cutoffs indicating rejection of hypotheses at some level of FDR control
rather than the usual significance level, instead. The FDR adjusted version of Table 4 is displayed in Table
6.
We observe that the FDR-adjusted p-values indicate that, when controlling at the 5% FDR, we would
only reject 4 out of the 8 hypotheses regarding the bias elements, and only 3 out of 28 hypotheses relating
to the interaction matrix. Thus, the use of FDR adjustment significantly reduces our power for detecting
an interesting interaction.
It is well-known that the method of Benjamini and Yekutieli [2001] is very conservative, especially when
there is a potentially large number of hypotheses where the null hypotheses are false. That is, when there
are many false null hypotheses, the method of Benjamini and Yekutieli [2001] controls the FDR at a level
that is substantially smaller than the specified cutoff level (i.e. 5%, above). To counteract this effect, it is
not uncommon to utilize an FDR cutoff that is larger than the significance level α, that would otherwise
be used in a significance test. Thus, we choose to control the FDR at the 10% level, which yields 5 out of
8 rejected bias elements, and 4 out of 28 rejected interaction elements.
As with Figure 1, we summarize the results of Tables 2 and 6 in Figure 2. We can interpret the diagram
as follows, with hypotheses declared rejected or otherwise at the 10% level of FDR control. Each node is
colored blue, grey, or red, depending on whether the hypothesis of the estimated bias of the corresponding
party is rejected with a positive bias, not rejected, or rejected with a negative bias, respectively. Each node
is more opaque if the absolute value of the estimated bias is higher.
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Table 6: Sub-table A contains the FDR-adjusted p-value for the tests that each bias vector element is equal
to zero. Sub-table B contains the FDR-adjusted p-value for the tests that each interaction matrix element
is equal to zero.
A
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP CULL
adj-p 1.88E-01 1.24E-05 8.52E-01 6.41E-03 8.45E-02 2.13E-02 2.13E-02 7.45E-01
B
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP
AG 9.84E-01
NXT 1.00E+00 1.00E+00
PHON 7.45E-01 1.00E+00 1.00E+00
LDP 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 2.33E-01
JLN 1.29E-01 1.84E-03 7.96E-02 6.75E-01 1.00E+00
DHJP 1.00E+00 2.33E-01 4.17E-05 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+00
CULL 1.00E+00 1.75E-01 1.00E+00 4.17E-05 1.00E+00 2.82E-01 2.33E-01
The edges connecting each node are either solid or dashed. A solid edge indicates that the corresponding
hypothesis of the interaction between the two connected parties is rejected, and a dashed edge indicates
that the hypothesis is not. An edge is colored blue if the interaction between the two parties is positive,
and a red edge indicates a negative interaction. The edge thickness is directly proportional to the negative
logarithm of the adjusted p-value of the corresponding interaction between the two parties.
4.1 Discussions
We begin by discussing the results from Table 5. The ALP is the oldest of the Australian parties and
has a continuous existence since 1891, where it has either governed or acted as the opposition [Weller and
Fleming, 2003]. As opposition, it is unsurprising that the ALP should have a low marginal probability
of agreement with the government. It is also unsurprising that AG has a low marginal probability of
agreement with the Government, since it is a progressive party with ideologies that are antithetical to neo-
liberalism and conservatism of the governing LNP (see, e.g., Miragliotta, 2010 and Mendes, 1998 regarding
the AG and LNP, respectively). Next, the high rates of agreement with the government, of PHON, LDP,
and CULL is also not surprising since PHON is largely a nationalistic and conservative party [Grant
et al., 2019] and the LDP is self-described as an economically neo-classically liberal and libertarian party
(cf. www.ldp.org.au/our_philosophy).
The low probability of agreement between JLN and the Government is somewhat surprising since JLN
is seen as a conservative party (cf. Wood et al., 2018). Both NXT and DHJP are largely personality-based
parties, with NXT being self identified as being a centralist party that seeks to break the duopoly of the
ALP and LNP [Kefford, 2018]. It is therefore unsurprising that NXT has an agreement probability that is
close to 50%. On the other hand, DHJP ran a single-issue policy platforms centered around judicial reform
(cf. www.justiceparty.com.au/our-policies), and thus we had no a priori expectations regarding the
relationship between DHJP and the conservative Government. It is therefore of great interest to observe
that DHJP is generally amenable to the position of the Government.
Next, we discuss the results from Tables 2 and 6, via the aid of Figure 2. We observe that upon
controlling the FDR at the 10% level and in the presence of the interactions, PHON, LDP, and DHJP are
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Figure 2: Visualization of the FDR control and interaction results from Tables 2 and 6. Descriptions of the
various elements of the figure appear within the text.
biased towards agreement with the Government, and AG and JLN are biased towards disagreement with
the Government. We also observe that ALP, NXT, and CULL have no bias either way.
The biased positions of PHON and LDP towards agreement, and AG towards disagreement is not
surprising, as has been discussed above. However, the bias against the Government by JLN is surprising,
but is in correspondence with what we observed from Table 5. The bias towards agreement by DHJP is
also in correspondence with the above 50% marginal rate of agreement, that was observed in Table 5.
Of the three parties that exhibit a lack of bias, when controlled at the 10% FDR level, the result for
NXT and CULL are not surprising. As we have already discussed, NXT and CULL are both parties that
are heavily driven by interactions with other parties (PHON and DHJP, respectively). Given the strong
bias towards voting for the government of both PHON and DHJP, it is unsurprising that these strong
interactions drive the marginal rate of agreement of both NXT and CULL, upwards.
It is however surprising that ALP should lack a bias, given that they are the opposition to the Govern-
ment. We observe from Table 4 that the downward bias from the ALP is significant at the α = 0.1 level.
We thus propose that the lack of rejection of the hypothesis for the bias element associated with the ALP
may be due to sampling error. Another potential reason is that the ALP and LNP have had a history of
voting together on issues such as defense, in the spirit of bipartisanship (see, e.g., Murphy, 2014 and Carr,
2015). It is a matter of debate as to whether this bipartisanship represents a lack of ideological difference
between the two parties or whether the behavior is merely pragmatic in nature.
We now discuss the interactions between the parties. The least surprising of the interactions is that
between PHON and CULL, given that they voted the same way on all 12 Senate questions. Next, the
positive interaction between AG and JLN is perhaps due to the fact that Jacqui Lambie, along with two of
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the nine AG Senators are Tasmanian (cf. Evans, 2016, Tab. 1 and Bolwell and Eccleston, 2017), and thus
are allied in voting in a manner that best benefits the state.
The positive interaction between NXT and JLN is more obvious as both Nick Xenophon as the two
parties had agreed to an alliance prior to the 2016 election (cf. Atkin, 2015). Lastly, the positive interaction
between NXT and DHJP may come down to the two entities having formed an alliance in the Senate
(cf. Hinch, 2016).
5 Conclusion
We had set out with the aim to quantitatively analyze the degree to which each of the non-government
parties of the Senate of the 45th Australian Parliament were pro- or anti-Government, and the degree to
which the votes of each of the non-government Senate parties were in concordance or discordance with one
another. Using the FVBM as an inferential vehicle, we were able to satisfactorily achieve both of the stated
aims.
Our investigation centered around the analysis of the Senate data, that were described in Section 3. We
found that the use of an FVBM, fitted via MPLE, provided a good fit to the data. Furthermore, analysis
of these data revealed voting patterns that were largely supported by the literature and external sources.
In particular, our analyses of whether parties were pro- or anti-Government yielded results that were in
correspondence with the ideological positions of the assessed parties. Furthermore, identified interactions
between parties were in general accordance with identifiable parliamentary alliances. Thus, we conclude
that our FVBM methodology was successfully applied for the analysis of the Senate data, and may be
applicable to similarly structured data sets.
A number of possible future directions for our research have been identified. Firstly, we may consider the
case of dependent observations, and allow for autoregressive structures between voting events that follow
sequentially from each other. Secondly, we may allow for the bias and interaction parameter elements of the
FVBM to be parametrizable by covariates, in order to produce a richer class of models. Thirdly, we may
substitute the FDR control procedure with a regularization procedure, instead, using penalizations such
as the LASSO of Tibshirani [1996]. Such a procedure may be more powerful in identifying relationships
between political entities. Finally, given the parametric construction of the FVBM, it is conceivable that we
may be able to conduct missing data imputation and parameter estimation, simultaneously. The derivation
of such an algorithm, as well as progress with respect to the other future directions, would require significant
further technical developments, which cannot be achieved within the length and scope constraints of this
manuscript.
Appendix
Sensitivity of the analysis to k in k-nearest neighbor imputation
As discussed in Section 3.1, k-nearest neighbor imputation was used to account for missing data in our
Senate voting data set, where k = 3. The choice of k = 3 was made based on a recommendation by
Beretta and Santaniello [2016], who observed that the choice provided a good balance between precision
and generalizability.
In order to assess whether our analyses was sensitive to the choice, we also conducted k = 1 and k = 5
imputation, and fitted FVBMs to our differently imputed data. We reproduce Tables 2 and 6 for the two
alternative choices of k. Tables 7 and 8 contain the MPLE and FDR-adjusted p-values, computed after
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Table 7: Sub-table A contains the estimated values of the bias vector (i.e. b˜n), computed after
1-nearest neighbor imputation. Sub-table B contains the corresponding estimated values of the unique
elements of the interaction matrix (i.e M˜n).
A
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP CULL
Bias -0.250 -1.031 -0.150 1.026 0.180 -0.636 0.650 -0.352
B
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP
AG -0.306
NXT -0.209 -0.272
PHON -0.345 0.065 0.327
LDP 0.093 0.062 -0.103 0.654
JLN 0.498 0.752 0.405 0.506 -0.069
DHJP 0.044 0.594 0.672 -0.525 0.269 0.067
CULL 0.014 -0.743 -0.049 1.225 0.169 0.412 0.746
1-nearest neighbor imputation. Tables 9 and 10 contain the MPLE and FDR-adjusted p-values, computed
after 5-nearest neighbor imputation.
From Tables 7 and 9, we observe that, although there are small deviations in the value of the MPLE
estimates, the direction of the estimated biases and interactions are the same as those that are reported in
Table 2. The results from Table 10 show that the conclusions drawn with FDR controlled at the 10% level,
under 5-nearest neighbor imputation, is the same as the conclusions that can be drawn from Table 6.
We observe that there are some small differences in conclusions, when drawing inference with FDR
controlled at the 10% level, between Tables 6 and 8. Firstly, we no longer reject the assumption of no
bias for LDP, and we no longer infer interactions between JLN and NXT. We reject an additional two
interaction hypotheses, however, between ALP and JLN, and between PHON and LDP. None of these
changes contradict the conclusions that we have drawn in Section 4.
Simulation results from Beretta and Santaniello [2016] show that 1-nearest neighbor imputation can of-
ten be inaccurate, when compared to larger values of k. However, the simulations of Beretta and Santaniello
[2016] were for a real-valued regression problem, rather than a binary PMF estimation problem. Thus, we
are cautious to make any stronger claims regarding the relevance of their results to our modeling problem.
We believe that a model-based approach that conducts imputation and estimation, simultaneously, may re-
solve our problem of having to choose tune our imputation scheme. However, as we have already mentioned
in our conclusion, this would constitute a significant amount of new work that lies outside the scope of this
manuscript.
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Table 8: Sub-table A contains the FDR-adjusted p-value for the tests that each bias vector element is
equal to zero, computed after 1-nearest neighbor imputation. Sub-table B contains the corresponding
FDR-adjusted p-value for the tests that each interaction matrix element is equal to zero.
A
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP CULL
adj-p 5.12E-01 1.83E-05 1.00E+00 2.69E-03 8.86E-01 6.92E-03 2.60E-02 8.45E-01
B
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP
AG 2.87E-01
NXT 6.98E-01 1.00E+00
PHON 6.98E-01 1.00E+00 1.00E+00
LDP 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 5.00E-02
JLN 1.73E-03 6.92E-05 1.54E-01 2.87E-01 1.00E+00
DHJP 1.00E+00 1.93E-01 9.47E-05 6.98E-01 4.86E-01 1.00E+00
CULL 1.00E+00 1.54E-01 1.00E+00 6.92E-05 1.00E+00 2.87E-01 1.93E-01
Table 9: Sub-table A contains the estimated values of the bias vector (i.e. b˜n), computed after
5-nearest neighbor imputation. Sub-table B contains the corresponding estimated values of the unique
elements of the interaction matrix (i.e M˜n).
A
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP CULL
Bias -0.326 -1.077 -0.185 0.830 0.532 -0.555 0.751 -0.433
B
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP
AG -0.209
NXT -0.197 -0.256
PHON -0.355 0.058 0.349
LDP 0.149 0.121 -0.199 0.532
JLN 0.312 0.623 0.421 0.358 0.033
DHJP 0.068 0.593 0.791 -0.488 0.050 0.093
CULL 0.053 -0.754 -0.119 1.226 0.314 0.395 0.824
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Table 10: Sub-table A contains the FDR-adjusted p-value for the tests that each bias vector element
is equal to zero, computed after 5-nearest neighbor imputation. Sub-table B contains the corresponding
FDR-adjusted p-value for the tests that each interaction matrix element is equal to zero.
A
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP CULL
adj-p 1.88E-01 2.45E-05 1.00E+00 3.45E-02 3.45E-02 2.82E-02 2.82E-02 5.90E-01
B
Party ALP AG NXT PHON LDP JLN DHJP
AG 9.20E-01
NXT 9.97E-01 1.00E+00
PHON 9.13E-01 1.00E+00 1.00E+00
LDP 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 2.27E-01
JLN 1.48E-01 2.05E-03 7.37E-02 9.13E-01 1.00E+00
DHJP 1.00E+00 2.27E-01 2.97E-05 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+00
CULL 1.00E+00 1.64E-01 1.00E+00 2.07E-04 1.00E+00 2.98E-01 2.27E-01
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